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Many real-life decision-making problems incorporate higher-order structure, involving interdependencies between different stimuli,
actions, and subsequent rewards. It is not known whether brain regions implicated in decision making, such as the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), use a storedmodel of the task structure to guide choice (model-baseddecisionmaking) ormerely learn action
or state values without assuming higher-order structure as in standard reinforcement learning. To discriminate between these possibil-
ities, we scanned human subjects with functionalmagnetic resonance imagingwhile they performed a simple decision-making taskwith
higher-order structure, probabilistic reversal learning. We found that neural activity in a key decision-making region, the vmPFC, was
more consistent with a computationalmodel that exploits higher-order structure thanwith simple reinforcement learning. These results
suggest that brain regions, such as the vmPFC, use an abstractmodel of task structure to guide behavioral choice, computations thatmay
underlie the human capacity for complex social interactions and abstract strategizing.
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Introduction
Adaptive reward-based decisionmaking in an uncertain environ-
ment requires the ability to form predictions of expected future
reward associated with particular sets of actions and then bias
action selection toward those actions leading to greater reward
(Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2005). Reinforcement
learning (RL) models provide a strong theoretical account for
how this might be implemented in the brain (Sutton and Barto,
1998). However, an important limitation of these models is that
they fail to exploit higher-order structures in a decision problem
such as interdependencies between different stimuli, actions, and
subsequent rewards. Yet, many real-life decision problems do
incorporate such structures (Herrnstein, 1974; O’Doherty et al.,
2001; Sugrue et al., 2004).
To determine whether neural activity in brain areas involved in
decision making is accounted for by a computational decision-
making algorithm incorporating an abstractmodel of task structure
or else by simple RL,we conducted a functionalmagnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study in which subjects performed a simple
decision-making problemwith higher-order structure, probabilistic
reversal learning (O’Doherty et al., 2001; J. O’Doherty et al., 2003;
Cools et al., 2002) (see Fig. 1A). The higher-order structure in this
task is the anticorrelation between the reward distributions associ-
ated with the two options and the knowledge that the contingencies
will reverse.
To capture the higher-order structure in the task, we used a
Markov model (see Fig. 1B) that incorporates an abstract state
variable, the “choice state.” The model observes an outcome
(gain or loss) with a probability that depends on the choice state;
if the choice state is “correct,” then the outcome is more likely to
be high; otherwise, the outcome is more likely to be low. The
observations are used to infer whether the choice state is correct
or not. The crucial difference between a simple RLmodel and the
(Markov) model with an abstract hidden state is that in the
formermodel, only the value of the chosen option is updated and
the valuation of the option that was not chosen does not change
(see Materials and Methods), whereas in the latter state-based
model, both choice expectations change: if stimulus A is chosen
and the probability that the choice state is correct is estimated to
be, say, 3/4, then the probability that the other stimulus, B, is
correct is assumed to be 1/4 ( 1 3/4).
One region that may be especially involved in encoding
higher-order task structure is the prefrontal cortex (PFC). This
region has long been associatedwith higher-order cognitive func-
tions, including working memory, planning, and decision mak-
ing (Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Owen, 1997; Bechara et al., 2000).
Recent neurophysiological evidence implicates PFC neurons in
encoding abstract rules (Wallis et al., 2001; Genovesio et al.,
2005). On these grounds, we predicted that parts of the human
PFC would correlate better with an abstract state-based decision
algorithm than with simple RL. We focused on parts of the PFC
known to play an important role in reward-based decision mak-
ing, specifically its ventral and medial aspects (Bechara et al.,
2000; J. O’Doherty et al., 2003).
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Sixteen healthy normal subjects participated in this study (14
right handed; eight females). The subjects were preassessed to exclude
those with a previous history of neurological or psychiatric illness. All
Received March 7, 2006; revised July 7, 2006; accepted July 8, 2006.
This workwas supported by California Institute of Technology start-up funds to J.P.O. from the Gimbel Discovery
Fund in Neuroscience. A.N.H. was partly supported by the Physical Sciences Division of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Office of Biological and Physical Research. We thank Nathaniel Daw for helpful comments on
this manuscript. We also thank Steve Flaherty and Mike Tyzska for technical and MRI support.
Correspondence should be addressed to Dr. John P. O’Doherty, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology, 1200 East California Boulevard, M/C 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125. E-mail:
jdoherty@hss.caltech.edu.
DOI:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1010-06.2006
Copyright © 2006 Society for Neuroscience 0270-6474/06/268360-08$15.00/0
8360 • The Journal of Neuroscience, August 9, 2006 • 26(32):8360–8367
subjects gave informed consent, and the review board at the California
Institute of Technology approved the study.
Task description. Subjects participated in a simple decision-making
task with higher-order structure, probabilistic reversal learning. On each
trial, they were simultaneously presented with the same two arbitrary
fractal stimuli objects (random left–right spatial position) and asked to
select one. One stimulus was designated the correct stimulus in that
choice of that stimulus lead to a monetary reward (winning 25 cents) on
70% of occasions and a monetary loss (losing 25 cents) 30% of the time.
Consequently, choice of this correct stimulus lead to accumulatingmon-
etary gain. The other stimulus was incorrect in that choice of that stim-
ulus lead to a reward 40% of the time and a punishment 60% of the time,
thus leading to a cumulative monetary loss. The specific reward sched-
ules used here are based on those used in previous studies of probabilistic
reversal learning (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Hornak et al., 2004). After
having chosen the correct stimulus on four consecutive occasions, the
contingencies reversed with a probability of 0.25 on each successive trial.
Once reversal occurred, subjects then needed to choose the new correct
stimulus, on four consecutive occasions, before reversal could occur
again (with 0.25 probability). Subjects were informed that reversals oc-
curred at random intervals throughout the experiment but were not
informed of the precise details of how reversals were triggered by the
computer (so as to avoid subjects using explicit strategies, such as count-
ing the number of trials to reversal). The subject’s task was to accumulate
as much money as possible and thus keep track of which stimulus was
currently correct and choose it until reversal occurs. In the scanner,
visual input was provided with Restech goggles (Resonance Technolo-
gies, Northridge, CA), and subjects used a button box to choose a stim-
ulus. At the same time that the outcome was revealed, the total money
wonwas also displayed. In addition to the reversal trials, we also included
null event trials that were 33%of the total number of trials and randomly
intermixed with the reversal trials. These trials consisted of the presenta-
tion of a fixation cross for 7 s. Before entering the scanner, subjects were
informed that they would receive what they earned, plus an additional
$25. If they sustained an overall loss, then that loss would be subtracted
from the $25. On average, subjects accumulated a total of $3.80 ($0.70)
during the experiment.
Prescan training. Before scanning, the subjects were trained on three
different versions of the task. The first was a simple version of the reversal
task, in which one of the two fractals yielded monetary rewards 100% of
the time and the other yielded monetary losses 100% of the time. These
then reversed according to the same criteria as in the imaging experiment
proper, in which a reversal was triggered with a probability of 0.25 after
four consecutive choices of the correct stimulus. This training phase was
ended after the subject successfully completed three sequential reversals.
The second training phase consisted of the presentation of two stimuli
that delivered probabilistic rewards and punishments as in the experi-
ment, but in which the contingencies did not reverse. The training ended
after the subject consecutively chose the correct stimulus 10 times in a
row. The final training phase consisted of the same task parameters as in
the actual imaging experiment (stochastic rewards and punishments,
and stochastic reversals, as described above). This phase ended after the
subject successfully completed two sequential reversals. Different fractal
stimuli were used in the training session from those used in the scanner.
Subjects were informed that they would not receive remuneration for
their performance during the training session.
RL model. RL is concerned with learning predictions of the future
reward that will be obtained from being in a particular state of the world
or performing a particular action. Many different varieties of RL algo-
rithms exist. In this study, we used a range of well known RL algorithms
to find the one that provided the best fit to the subjects’ choice data (see
supplemental Fig. 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental ma-
terial, for the comparison of behavioral fits between algorithms). The
best-fitting RL algorithm was then compared against the state-based de-
cision model for the results reported in the study. A description of the
model-fitting procedure is below (see Behavioral data analysis).
The best-fitting algorithm to the subjects’ choice data was a variant of
Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992), in which action values are up-
dated via a simple Rescorla-Wagner (RW) rule (Rescorla and Wagner,
1972). On a trial, t, in which action a is selected, the value of a is updated
via a prediction error, , as follows:
Vat  1  Vat  t, (1)
where  is the learning rate. The (t) is calculated by comparing the
actual reward received, r(t), after choosing awith the expected reward for
that action as follows:
t  rt  Vat. (2)
When choosing between two different states (a and b), the model com-
pares the expected values to select which will give it the most reward in
the future. The probability of choosing state a is as follows:
PA  Va  Vb  , (3)
where  (z) 1/(1 exp( z)) is the Luce choice rule (Luce, 2003) or
logistic sigmoid,  is the indecision point (when it is equiprobable to
make either choice), and  is the degree of stochasticity in making the
choice (i.e., the exploration/exploitation parameter).
Abstract state-based model. We constructed a Bayesian Hidden State
MarkovModel (HMM) (Ghahramani, 2001) that incorporates the struc-
ture of the probabilistic reversal learning task (see Fig. 1B) and that can
be solved optimallywith belief propagation techniques (Jordan, 1998).Xt
represents the abstract hidden state (correct or incorrect choice) that
subjects have to infer at time t. Yt represents the reward (positive) or
punishment (negative) value subjects receive at time t. St represents
whether subjects switched or stayed between time t 1 and time t. The
conditional probabilities linking the random variables are as follows:
PXt/Xt1 , St  stay  1   1  ,
(4)
PXt/Xt1 , St  switch   1 1   ,
PYt/Xt  i  N	i , i.
The first two conditional probabilities describe the transition probabili-
ties of the hidden-state variable from trial to trial. If the subjects stay
(make the same choice as in the previous trial) and their last choice was
correct (Xt-1 correct), then their new choice is incorrect (Xt incor-
rect) with probability , where  is the reversal probability (probability
that the contingencies in the task reverse) and that was considered to be
learned during training. Likewise, if the subjects stay, and their last choice
was incorrect (Xt-1 incorrect), then their new choicewill be correct with
probability . On the other hand, if subjects switch, with their last choice
being incorrect, the new choicemight still be incorrect with probability .
The state transition matrices in Equation 4 incorporate the structural
relationship between the reversing task contingencies and the subjects’
switches. To complete the model, we include the probability of receiving
a reward, P(Y/X ), given the state (correct or incorrect choice) the sub-
jects are in. This was modeled as a Gaussian distribution, the mean of
which is the expectedmonetary reward each state has. In the present task,
the actual expected value of the correct choice is 10 cents and the ex-
pected value of the incorrect choice is 5 cents. However, to allow for
possible variation in the accuracy of the subjects’ estimates of the ex-
pected values of each choice, we left these expected values as free param-
eters when fitting the Bayesian model to each subject’s behavioral data.
Fitted parameters for the reversal probability and expected rewards were
close to the actual experimental parameters (supplemental Table 1, avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
With P(X0)  (0.5,0.5) at the beginning of the experiment, Bayesian
inference was performed to calculate the posterior probability of the
random variableX (correct/incorrect choice) given the obtained rewards
and punishments (variable Y ) and the subjects’ switches (variable S)
using causal belief propagation (Eqs. 5, 6). Equation 5 specifies the sub-
jects’ “prior,” or belief that they will be at a given internal state at time t as
a consequence of their choice St and the internal state “posterior” from
the previous trial. Equation 6 updates this prior with the observed re-
ward/punishment Yt to obtain the current posterior, or optimal assess-
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ment, of the state at time t. These equations have the Markov property
that knowledge of only the posterior from the previous trial as well as the
last reward/punishment and behavioral action are needed to calculate the
posterior of the next trial (an introduction to HMMs is provided in
supplemental Materials and Methods, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material).
PriorXt  correct 
Xt1 states
PXt correct/Xt 1 , StPosteriorXt 1,
(5)
PosteriorXt  correct
PYt/Xt  correctPriorXt  correct
Xt states
PYt/XtPriorXt
.
(6)
For the reversal task, the consequence of action switch (or stay) is linear
with the inferred posterior probability that the subjects are making the
incorrect (or correct) choice (and so are the expected rewards). The
decision to switch is thus based on the probability that the current choice
is incorrect, Posterior(Xt  incorrect) (the close correspondence be-
tween the model-estimated posterior that the current choice was incor-
rect and the subjects’ actual choice behavior is illustrated in Fig. 1C). We
assume a stochastic relationship between actual choice as well as the
probability that the current choice is incorrect and use the logistic sig-
moid as in Equation 3:
Pswitch Pincorrect . (7)
The state-based model we use here assumes that subjects use a fixed
probability of reversal that is uniform on all trials in which the correct
stimulus is being chosen. However, in actuality, the probability of rever-
sal is not uniformly distributed over all the trials, because after subjects
switch their choice, the reversal probability is set to zero until subjects
make the correct choice on four consecutive occasions. We compared a
version of the state-based model that incorporates the full reversal rule
(zero probability of reversal until four consecutive correct choices are
made, and a fixed probability thereafter) with that which incorporates a
simple rule based on a single fixed probability. The latter model was
found to provide a marginally better fit (with a log likelihood of 0.29
compared with 0.40 for the full model) to the subjects’ actual behav-
ioral choices. This justifies use of a state-basedmodel with this simplified
reversal rule in all subsequent analyses.
Behavioral data analysis. Both the RL and state-based model decision
probabilities P(switch/stay) were fitted against the behavioral data
B(switch/stay). The state-based model calculates the probability of
switching through Equation 7. The RL model computes the probability
of choosing one stimulus versus another but can be converted to a
switch/stay probability based on the subject’s previous selection [i.e.,
P(switch)  P(choose A) if the subject chose B in the previous trial, and
vice versa]. On average, subjects switched 22 2 times during the exper-
iment, of 104 trials, so we used a maximum log likelihood fitting cri-
teria that weighed switching and staying conditions equally:
log L
Bswitch log Pswitch
Nswitch

Bstay log Pstay
Nstay
. (8)
Model parameters were fitted using a variant of a simulating annealing
procedure (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983). A comparison of the log likelihood
of the Bayesian model and a number of RL models is shown in supple-
mental Figure 1 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental mate-
rial), and a time plot of subject choices versusmodel predictions is shown
in supplemental Figure 2 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemen-
tal material). The Bayesian model has a better log likelihood fit than the
best-fitting RL model ( p 	 107, paired t test). This is also true even
when using a penalized log likelihood measure [Bayes Information Cri-
terion (BIC)] that takes into account the number of free parameters in
eachmodel (Schwarz, 1978), as shown in Eq. 9, whereM is the number of
free parameters (five for the Bayesianmodel, three for themodel-free RL)
and N is the total number of data points:
BIC2 log LM
log N
N
. (9)
The mean fitted parameter values across subjects for the Bayesian model
and the best-fitting RL model are shown in supplemental Table 1 (avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). These parameters
were usedwhen fitting themodels to the fMRI data.We assumed subjects
would learn the task structure and reward contingencies during the train-
ing period and keep these parameters fixed during task execution.
We note that although the approach we use here of deriving best-
fitting parameters from the subjects’ behavior and regressing the model
with these parameters against the fMRI data is perhaps the most parsi-
monious way to constrain our model-based analysis, this approach as-
sumes that behavior is being controlled by a single unitary learning sys-
tem with a single set of model parameters. However, it is possible that
behavior may be controlled by multiple parallel learning systems, each
with distinct model parameters (Tanaka et al., 2004; Glascher et al.,
2005), and as such thesemultiple learning systems would not be discrim-
inated using our approach.
fMRI data acquisition. Functional imaging was conducted using a Sie-
mens (Erlangen, Germany) 3.0 tesla Trio MRI scanner to acquire gradi-
ent echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images. To optimize functional sen-
sitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), we acquired the data using an
oblique orientation of 30° to the anterior commissure–posterior com-
missure axis. A total of 580 volumes (19 min) were collected during the
experiment in an interleaved-ascending manner. The imaging parame-
ters were as follows: echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm; in-plane
resolution and slice thickness, 3 mm; repetition time (TR), 2 s. High-
resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1
 1
 1 mm) were acquired
for anatomical localization. Image analysis was performed using SPM2
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurol-
ogy, London, UK). Preprocessing included slice-timing correction (cen-
tered at TR/2), motion correction, spatial normalization to a standard
T2* template with a resampled voxel size of 3mm, and spatial smoothing
using an 8 mm Gaussian kernel. Intensity normalization and high-pass
temporal filtering (128 s) were also applied to the data (Friston et al.,
1995).
fMRI data analysis. The event-related fMRI data were analyzed by
constructing sets of  (stick) functions at the time of the choice and at the
time of the outcome. Additional regressors were constructed by using
themodel-estimated prior probabilities as amodulating parameter at the
time of choice and the state-based prediction error signal (posterior–
prior probabilities) as amodulating parameter at the time of outcome. In
addition, wemodeled the subjects’ behavioral decision (to switch vs stay)
by time-locking a regressor to the expected time of onset of the next trial
(2 s after the outcome is revealed). All of these regressors were convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). In addition,
the six scan-to-scan motion parameters produced during realignment
were included to account for residual motion effects. These were fitted to
each subject individually, and the regression parameters were then taken
to the random-effects level to obtain the results shown in Figures 2 and 4.
All reported fMRI statistics and p values arise from group random-effects
analyses. We report those activations as significant in a priori regions of
interest that exceed a threshold of p	 0.001 uncorrected, whereas acti-
vations outside regions of interest are reported only if they exceed a
threshold of p	 0.05 after whole-brain correction for multiple compar-
isons. Our a priori regions of interest are as follows: PFC (ventral and
dorsal aspects), anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, amygdala, and
striatum (dorsal and ventral), because these areas have previously been
implicated in reversal learning and other reward-based decision-making
tasks (J. O’Doherty et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004).
Time series of fMRI activity in regions of interest (see Fig. 2D) were
obtained by extracting the first eigenvariate of the filtered raw time series
(after high-pass filtering and removal of the effects of residual subject
motion) from a 3 mm sphere centered at the peak voxel (from the
random-effects group level). Thiswas done separately for each individual
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subject, binned according to different trial types, and averaged across
trials and subjects. SPM normalizes the average fMRI activity to 100, so
that the filtered signal is considered as a percentage of change from
baseline. It is to be noted that the time series are not generated using
canonical HRF functions. More specifically, peak blood oxygenation
level-dependent (BOLD) activity is lagged with respect to the time of the
event that generated it. For example, activity arising as a consequence of
neural activity at the time of choice will have its maximum effect 4–6 s
after the time of choice as expressed in the time-series plot.
We also compared the best-fitting model-free RL and Bayesian algo-
rithms directly (see Fig. 3B) by fitting both models at the same time with
the fMRI data. To make both models as similar as possible, we used the
normalized value and prediction error signals from the RW model as
regressors (modulating activity at the time of the trial onset and outcome,
respectively) and the normalized prior correct and prediction error (pos-
terior correct–prior correct) from the state-based model as regressors
(modulating activity at the time of the trial onset and outcome, respec-
tively). Separate reward and punishment regressors were also fitted at the
time of the outcome. Prior correct–value contrasts were calculated at the
individual level and taken to the random-effects level to determinewhich
areas had a better correlation with the state-based model.
To calculate the predicted value and prior correct signals for the stan-
dard RL and state-based model shown in Figure 3, we calculated the
expected value (from the RW model) and prior correct value (derived
from the state-based model) on all trials in which subjects received a
punishment and for the immediately subsequent trial. We then sorted
these estimates into two separate categories according to whether sub-
jects switched their choice of stimulus or maintained their choice of
stimulus (stay) on the subsequent trial.
Results
Behavioral measures
The decision to switch is implemented on the basis of the poste-
rior probability that the last choice was incorrect. The higher this
probability, the more likely a subject is to switch (Fig. 1C). The
state-based model predicts the subjects’ actual choice behavior
(whether to switch or not) with an accu-
racy of 92  2%. On average, subjects
made the objectively correct choice (chose
the action associated with the high proba-
bility of reward) on 61  2% of trials,
which is close to the performance of the
state-based model (using the parameters
estimated from the subjects’ behavior)
that correctly selected the best available ac-
tion on 63% of trials. This is also close to
the optimal performance of the state-
based model that was 64% (using the ac-
tual task parameters).
Prior correct signal in the brain
The model-estimated prior probability
that the current choice is correct (prior
correct) informs about the expected re-
ward value of the currently chosen action.
The prior correct signal was found to have
a highly statistically significant correlation
with neural activity in the medial PFC
(mPFC), the adjacent OFC, and the amyg-
dala bilaterally (Fig. 2) (the correlation in
the mPFC was significant at a corrected
level for multiple comparisons across the
entire brain at p 	 0.05). These findings
are consistent with previous reports of a
role for the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC)
and amygdala in encoding expected re-
ward value (Thorpe et al., 1983; Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Got-
tfried et al., 2003; Holland and Gallagher, 2004; Knutson et al.,
2005). This evidence has, however, generally been interpreted in
the context of RL models.
To plot activity in themPFC against the prior probabilities, we
sorted trials into one of five bins to capture different ranges in the
prior probabilities and fitted each bin separately to the fMRI data.
This analysis showed a strong linear relationship between the
magnitude of the evoked fMRI signal in this region and the prior
correct probabilities (Fig. 2C). We also extracted the percentage
of signal change time courses from the same region and show
these results in Figure 2D, plotted separately for trials associated
with high and low prior probabilities. The time courses show an
increase in signal at the time of the choice reflected on trials with
a high prior correct and a decrease in signal at the time of the
choice for trials with a low prior correct.
Posterior–prior correct update
The difference between the posterior correct (at the time of the
reward outcome) and the prior correct can be considered an
update signal of the prior probabilities once a reward/punish-
ment is received. This signal was significantly correlated with
activity in the ventral striatum, as well as in other brain areas such
as the dorsomedial and vmPFC (Fig. 2B). This update is also
reflected in the time course plots frommPFC in Figure 2D. Trials
with a low prior inwhich a reward is obtained show an increase in
signal at the time of the outcome, whereas trials with a high prior
in which a punishment is obtained result in a decrease in signal at
outcome. Thus, the response at the time of the posterior differs
depending on the prior probabilities and whether the outcome is
a reward or punishment, fully consistent with the notion that this
reflects an update of the prior probabilities.
Figure 1. Reversal task setup and state-based decision model. A, Subjects choose one of two fractals that on each trial are
randomly placed to the left or right of the fixation cross. Once the subject selects a stimulus, it increases in brightness and remains
on the screen until 2 s after the choice. After an additional 3 s, a reward (winning 25 cents, depicted by a quarter dollar coin) or
punishment (losing 25 cents, depicted by a quarter dollar coin covered by a red cross) is delivered, with the total money earned
displayed at the top of the screen. One stimulus is designated the correct stimulus, and the choice of that stimulus leads to a
monetary reward on 70%of occasions and amonetary loss 30%of the time. Consequently, choice of this correct stimulus leads to
accumulatingmonetary gain. The other stimulus is incorrect, and choosing that stimulus leads to a reward 40% of the time and a
punishment60%of the time, leading toa cumulativemonetary loss. After subjects choose the correct stimuluson four consecutive
occasions, the contingencies reverse with a probability of 0.25 on each successive trial. Subjects have to infer the reversal took
place and switch their choice, and at that point the process is repeated. B, We constructed an abstract-state-based model that
incorporates the structure of the reversal task in the form of a Bayesian HMM that uses previous choice and reward history to infer
the probability of being in the correct/incorrect choice state. The choice state changes (“transits”) from one period to another
depending on (1) the exogenously given chance that the options are reversed (the good action becomes the bad one, and vice
versa) and (2) the control (if the subject switches when the actual, but hidden, choice state is correct, then the choice state
becomes incorrect, and vice versa). Y, Observed reward/punishment; S, observed switch/stay action; X, abstract correct/incorrect
choice state that is inferred at each time step (see Materials and Methods). The arrows indicate the causal relationships among
random variables. C, Observed choice frequencies that subjects switch (black) or stay (gray) against the inferred posterior proba-
bility of the state-based model that their last choice was incorrect. The higher the posterior incorrect probability, the more likely
subjects switch (relative choice frequencies are calculated separately for each posterior probability bin).
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Abstract-state model versus standard
RL: the response profile of neural
activity in the human vmPFC
The prior correct signal from the state-
based model is almost identical to the ex-
pected reward signal from the RL model.
Nevertheless, our paradigm permits sharp
discrimination between the two models.
The predictions of the two models differ
immediately after a switch in the subjects’
action choice. According to bothmodels, a
switch of stimulus should bemore likely to
occur when the expected value of the cur-
rent choice is low, which will happen after
receiving monetary losses on previous tri-
als. What distinguishes the two models is
what happens to the expected value of the
newly chosen stimulus after subjects
switch. According to simple RL, the ex-
pected value of this new choice should also
be low, because that was the value it had
when the subject had previously stopped
selecting it and switched choice (usually
after receiving monetary losses on that
stimulus). Because simple RL only updates
the value of the chosen action, the value of
the nonchosen action stays low until the
next time that an action is selected. How-
ever, according to a state-based inference
model, as soon as a subject switches action
choice, the expected reward value of the
newly chosen action should be high. The
known structure of the reversal task incor-
porates the fact that once the value of one
action is low, the value of the other is high.
Thus, in a brain region implementing
abstract-state-based decision making, the
prior correct signal (that reflects expected
value) should jump up after reversal, even
before an outcome (and subsequent pre-
diction error) is experienced on that new
action. In RL, the value of the new action
will only be updated after an outcome and
subsequent prediction error. This point is
illustrated in Figure 3A where the model-
predicted expected value signals are plot-
ted for simple RL and for the state-based
model, before and after reversal. Changes
in activation in the vmPFC after choice
switches correspond to those predicted by
the abstract-state-based model: activation
decreases after a punishment and if the
subject does not switch, but it increases af-
ter switching, rejecting the RL model in
favor of the model with an abstract hidden
state (supplemental Fig. 3, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material).
To further validate this point, we conducted an fMRI analysis
in which we pitted the state-based model and the best-fitting (to
behavior) RL algorithm against each other, to test which of these
provides a better fit to neural activity. A direct comparison be-
tween the regression fits for the state-based model and those for
RL revealed that the former was a significantly better fit to the
fMRI data in themPFC at p	 0.001 (Fig. 3B). Although the peak
difference was in themPFC, the state-basedmodel also fit activity
better in themedial OFC at a slightly lower significance threshold
( p	 0.01). This suggests that abstract state-based decision mak-
ing may be especially localized to the vmPFC.
Figure2. Correct choiceprior andposterior–prior update signals in thebrain.A, Brain regions showinga significant correlation
with theprior correct signal fromthe state-baseddecisionmodel (time-locked to the timeof choice). Strong correlationswithprior
correctwere found in the vmPFC (mPFC: 6, 57,6mm; z5.33; OFC: 0, 33,24mm; z4.04) aswell as in the posterior dorsal
amygdala (extending into the anterior hippocampus). The activations are shown superimposed on a subject-averaged structural
scan, and the threshold is set at p	 0.001. L, Left. B, Brain regions correlating with the posterior–prior update signal. This is a
formof prediction error signal that reflects the difference in value between the prior probability that the choicewill be correct and
the posterior probability that the choice was correct after receipt of the outcome (a reward or punishment). This signal is signifi-
cantly correlated with activity in the bilateral ventral striatum (24, 3, 9 mm; z  4.64; 18, 3, 15 mm; z  4.48),
dorsomedial PFC (6, 54,24mm; z 3.54), and vmPFC (12, 51,15mm; z 3.72). These fMRI contrasts are fromgroup
random-effects analyses. C, The relationship between fMRI responses in the mPFC (A, yellow circle) at the time of choice and the
prior correct signal from the state-based model showed a strong colinearity, supporting the idea of an optimal inference of state
probabilities. To plot this activity against the prior probabilities, we sorted trials into one of five bins to capture different ranges in
the prior probabilities and fitted each bin separately to the fMRI data. D, The time course for the averaged percentage of signal
change in this same region (mPFC) is shown separately for trials with a high prior correct signal ( p 0.65) and low prior correct
signal ( p	 0.5). Error bars depict the SEM across all trials of that type. Trials are also separated according to whether a reward
(Rew) or a punishment (Pun)was received at the time of outcome to illustrate updating of the signal after feedback. The leftmost
shaded area indicates the period (1 s in length) in which subjects made their choice, and the second shaded area indicates the
period in which subjects were presented with their rewarding or punishing feedback. Trials with a low prior in which a reward is
obtained show an increase in signal at the time of the outcome (with the peak BOLD activity lagged by 4–6 s; see Materials and
Methods), whereas trials with a high prior in which a punishment is obtained result in a decrease in signal at outcome, consistent
with the possibility that the response at the time of outcome reflects an update signal. Error bars indicate SEM.
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Prior incorrect
We also tested for regions that correlated negatively with the
prior correct (i.e., areas correlating positivelywith the prior prob-
ability that the current action is incorrect). This analysis revealed
significant effects in other sectors of the PFC, including the fol-
lowing: specifically, the right dorsolateral PFC (rDLPFC), the
right anterior insular cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex
(Fig. 4A). Figure 4B shows the relation between the BOLD activ-
ity and the model prior incorrect signal in rDLPFC.
Behavioral decision to switch
Finally, we tested for regions involved in implementing the be-
havioral decision itself (to switch or stay). Enhanced responses
were found in the anterior cingulate cortex
and anterior insula on switch compared
with stay trials (Fig. 4C). This figure shows
that regions activated during the decision
to switch are in close proximity to those
areas that are significantly correlated with
the prior probability that the current
choice is incorrect as provided by the deci-
sion model.
Discussion
In this study, we set out to determine
whether during performance of a simple
decision task with a rudimentary higher-
order structure, human subjects engage in
state-based decision making in which
knowledge of the underlying structure of
the task is used to guide behavioral deci-
sions, or if, on the contrary, subjects use
the individual reward history of each ac-
tion to guide their decision making with-
out taking into account higher-order
structure (standard RL). The decision-
making task we used incorporates a very
simple higher-order structure and is based
on the following: the probability that one
action is correct (i.e., leading to the most
reward) is inversely correlated with the
probability that the other action is incor-
rect (i.e., leading to the least reward). Over
time, the contingencies switch, and once subjects work out that
the current action is incorrect, they should switch their choice of
action. We have captured state-based decision making in formal
terms with an elementary Bayesian Hidden Markov computa-
tional model that incorporates the task structure (by encoding
the inverse relationship between the actions and featuring a
known probability that the action reward contingencies will re-
verse). By performing optimal inference on the basis of this
known structure, the model is able to compute the probability
that the subjects shouldmaintain their current choice of action or
switch their choice of action.
The critical distinction between the state-based inference
Figure3. StandardRLandabstract-state-baseddecisionmodelsmakequalitativelydifferentpredictionsabout thebrainactivity after subjects switch their choice.A, Bothmodelspredictwhether
a decision is made to stay after being punished, the next action will have a lower expected value in the next trial (blue line). However, if a decision is made to switch choice of stimulus after being
punished, simple RL predicts that the expected value of the new choice will also be low (red line; left) because its value was not updated since the last time it was chosen. In contrast, a state-based
decisionmodel predicts that the expected valueof thenewchoicewill behigh. If the subjects havedetermined that their choice until nowwas incorrect (promptedby the last punishment), then their
new choice after switching is now correct and has a high expected value (red line; middle). Mean fMRI signal changes (time-locked to the time of choice) in the mPFC (derived from a 3mm sphere
centered at the peak voxel) plotted before and after reversal (right) show that activity in this region ismore consistent with the predictions of state-based decisionmaking than that of standard RL.
This indicates that the expected reward signal in the mPFC incorporates the structure of the reversal task. B, Direct comparison of brain regions correlating with the prior correct signal from the
state-basedmodel comparedwith theequivalent value signal (of the current choice) fromthe simpleRLmodel. A contrast between themodels revealed that the state-baseddecisionmodel accounts
significantly better for neural activity in the mPFC (6, 45,9 mm; z 3.68). L, Left.
Figure4. Incorrect choice prior and switch–stay signals in thebrain.A, Brain regions showinga significant correlationwith the
prior incorrect signal from the state-based algorithm (time-locked to the time of choice). Significant effects were found in the
rDLPFC (39, 36, 33mm; z 4.30), the anterior cingulate cortex (6, 21, 45mm; z 3.37), and the right anterior insula (48, 15, 9
mm; z 3.96). The thresholdwas set at p	 0.001.B, Plot showing relationship between fMRI responses in the dorsolateral PFC
at the time of choice and the prior incorrect signal from the Bayesianmodel, illustrating strong colinearity between this signal and
activity in this region. C, Brain regions responding to trials in which subjects decide to switch compared with when they do not
switch (stay) their choice of stimulus. Significant effects were found in the anterior cingulate cortex (3, 24, 30 mm; z 4.54)
and the anterior insula (39, 18,12mm; z 4.26; 51, 21, 3mm; z 4.23) bilaterally. The fact that the anterior cingulate and
anterior insula respond on these switch trials, as well as responding to the prior incorrect signals, suggest that the decision to
switch may be implemented in these regions. Error bars indicate SEM. L, Left.
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model and standard RL is what happens to the expected value of
the newly chosen stimulus after subjects switch. According to
standard RL, the expected value of the new choice should be low,
because that was the value it had when the subject had previously
stopped selecting it (usually after receiving monetary losses on
that stimulus). In contrast, the state-based algorithm predicts
that the expected value for the newly chosen action should be
high, because unlike standard RL, it incorporates the knowledge
that when one action is low in value, the other is high. By com-
paring neural activity in the brain before and after a switch of
stimulus, we have been able to show that, consistent with state-
based decision making, the expected value signal in the vmPFC
jumps up even before a reward is delivered on the newly chosen
action. This updating therefore does not occur at the time of
outcome via a standard reward prediction error (as in standard
RL). Rather, the updating seems to occur using previous knowl-
edge of the task structure. This suggests that the vmPFC partici-
pates in state-based inference rather than standard RL.
Our Bayesian Markov model is just one of a family of models
that incorporates the simple abstract structure of the task. Thus,
althoughwe show that vmPFC implements state-based inference,
we remain agnostic about the particular computational process
by which this inference is implemented. Furthermore, our find-
ings do not rule out a role for simple RL in human decision
making, but rather opens the question of how abstract-state-
based inference and simple RL might interact with each other to
control behavior (Daw et al., 2005). This also raises the question
of whether the dopaminergic system, the phasic activity of which
has been traditionally linked with a reward prediction error in
simple RL, subserves a similar function when the expected re-
wards are derived from an abstract-state representation. An im-
portant signal in our state-based model is the posterior correct
that represents an update of the prior correct probability based
on the outcome experienced on a particular trial. The difference
between the posterior and the prior looks like an error signal,
similar to prediction errors in standard RL, except that the up-
dates are based on the abstract states in the model. We found
significant correlations with this update signal (posterior–prior)
in the ventral striatum and mPFC, regions that have been associ-
ated previously with prediction error coding in neuroimaging
studies (McClure et al., 2003; J. P. O’Doherty et al., 2003;
O’Doherty et al., 2004; Seymour et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004)
(Fig. 2B). These findings are consistent with the possibility that the
vmPFC is involved in encoding the abstract-state space, whereas
standard RL is used to learn the values of the abstract states in the
model, an approach known as model-based RL (Sutton and Barto,
1998; Doya et al., 2002).
The final decision whether to switch or stay was associated
with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula,
consistent with previous reports of a role for these regions in
behavioral control (Bush et al., 2002; Cools et al., 2002; Tanji et
al., 2002; J.O’Doherty et al., 2003; Kerns et al., 2004;Walton et al.,
2004). These regions are in close proximity to areas that were
significantly correlated with the prior probability that the current
choice was incorrect as provided by the decision model. A plau-
sible interpretation of these findings is that the anterior insula
and anterior cingulate cortex may actually be involved in using
information about the inferred choice probabilities to compute
the decision itself.
In the present study, we provide evidence that neural activity
in the vmPFC reflects learning based on abstract states that cap-
ture interdependencies. Our results imply that the simple RL
model is not always appropriate in the analysis of learning in the
human brain. The capacity of the PFC to perform inference on
the basis of abstract states shown here could also underlie the
ability of humans to predict the behavior of others in complex
social transactions and economic games, and it accounts more
generally for the human ability of abstract strategizing (Camerer,
2003).
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